Το 2008, το bloomberg σε δημοσίευμα του είχε προειδοποιήσει ότι “τα CDS της Ισπανίας, της Ιταλίας και της Γαλλίας μοιάζουν με πυριτιδαποθήκη που αν τιναχτεί θα καταστρέψει τα πάντα”. Δεν μπορούσε όμως να βρεθεί τρόπος που αυτή η συσσωρευμένη “εκρηκτική ύλη” θα μπορούσε να εκραγεί. Τότε, Ελληνικά CDS δεν υπήρχαν.Όλοι γνωρίζουμε πως ενεργοποιούνται μεγάλες ποσότητες εκρηκτικών. Απαιτείται πυροκροτητής. Τα Ελληνικά CDS, που σήμερα υπάρχουν.
Το καθεστώς αδιαφάνειας που τα αγκαλιάζει αφού “κανείς δεν γνωρίζει πόσα και από που” τα κάνει ακόμα πιο επικίνδυνα. Είναι το ίδιο καθεστώς αδιαφάνειας που υπήρχε για τα τοξικά ομόλογα της Lehman, που κλόνισαν τον πλανήτη. Μόνο που τώρα τα μεγέθη είναι τέτοια που ουδείς γνωρίζει τις συνέπειες. Διαβάστε και αυτό: ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΗ: LEHMAN BROTHERS – ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ CDS. Δεν υπάρχει τέλειο έγκλημα…
Συμπερασματα (από τον Πόρτα – Πόρτα) :
1. Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs are the most aggressive in terms of taking open positions on default outcomes. But we have absolutely no idea how much of those positions (if any) were with peripheral Euro assets. Also, while the last two firms don’t break out income attributable to CDS activities (at least not that I could find), B of A made a huge portion of their profits in 2010 from them. (Note that Citi did not indicate how much of the CDS protection that they sold was covered by purchases of CDS insurance, so they may or may not be in that list as well.)
2. The aggregate CDS exposures of the big US banks are certainly large enough to be plausibly consistent with the BIS estimate of about $100 bn in indirect exposures to peripheral Europe. If you add up the highlighted numbers (and make a guess at Citi’s position), it seems reasonable to guess that the total net open positions on CDS protection sold to third parties by the big US banks is between $1,500 and $2,000billion. Attributing $35 bn of that (about 2%) to Greece, which has certainly had one of the most active markets (proportionally) for CDS contracts over the past year, doesn’t seem to be a stretch.
3. Banks do not have to provide much detail about the indirect credit exposures that they take on when they sell default insurance through the CDS market. We have incredibly scant information about the positions that US banks take through default insurance, and therefore no idea about how any individual bank will be affected by a Greek default.
4. It’s hard to find any other potential exposures to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal in the banks’ public filings, other than through CDS contracts. Combined with points 2 and 3 above, the process of elimination suggests to me that CDS contracts are indeed likely to be the source of the bulk of US banks’ indirect exposures to a Euro-zone default.
καλη χωνεψη.
ΠΠ
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